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Abstract
According to tracking theories of mental content, the world we conceive is determined by
the world we perceive, and the world we perceive is determined by the mind-independent
world as it is. This view is challenged by Kathleen Akins on the grounds that our sensory
systems are narcissistic, i.e., they have narrow operational interests and are largely uncon-
cerned with representing objective reality. Yet, if what we conceive is not a veridical repre-
sentation of the world, how is object-guided action in the world possible? This disconnect
is the “representational gap”. This paper will close this gap by arguing that Akins’ concept of
narcissism can be extended to describe all non-sensory mental objects: what we conceive
is a product of what we perceive, but what we perceive is constrained and determined by




Consider a busy marketplace. A direct realist account of mental content claims that sights,
sounds, smells, tastes and tactile sensations are available to awareness unmediated; we
see, hear, smell, taste and feel the marketplace as it is. While this is intuitive, an increasing
amount of contrary empirical evidence has resulted in this no longer serving as the received
view of the natural sciences. An alternative explanation is the representational theory of
mind: our sensory systems are like ﬁnely-tuned recording/measuring devices that track
external objects and transform this sensory data into internal stand-ins, conceptual repre-
sentations, which serve as the basic constituents of thought, i.e., beliefs and propositional
attitudes.1 This places our awareness one step away from the world as it is, while still
granting us indirect access to it. “Tracking theories” of mental content characterize con-
cepts both in terms of their direction of ﬁt and their direction of causation; concepts are
mind-to-world insofar as they ﬁt the properties of the external objects they represent, and
concepts are causally world-to-mind insofar as they are produced by objects and events
in the world [1]. By tracking objects and events, our percepts grant us reliable, structure-
preserving, and unbiased access to the world as it is, which in turn facilitates the formation
of stable, ordered, uniform concepts. Following Kathleen Akins, we shall hereafter refer to
this description of our representational disposition as the “traditional view”.
In her paper “Of Sensory Systems and the ’Aboutness’ of Mental States” [2], Akins chal-
lenges the “traditional view” on the basis that our sensory systems do not furnish the sort
of information the view assumes and requires. Rather than being recording and measur-
ing devices, at least some sensory systems are narcissistic, which is to say they have narrow
operational interests that do not include representing the external world veridically. Any
philosopher with naturalist inclinations may be tempted to defend the “traditional view”
by presenting examples of the property-tracking relations produced by our visual system;
1Some accounts view both sensory data and the mental content they produce as types of representations,
diﬀering only in form and function, and to distinguish them, the former are referred to as “percepts”, and the
latter, “concepts”. This is the convention that shall be employed in this paper.
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our visual system is like a little camera, they might say, and our mental representations are
the photographs it produces. Yet, if Akins’ analysis of narcissistic thermoreceptors can be
extended to vision (subsection 2.4, subsection 2.5, subsection 2.6) this would demonstrate
that both the “little camera” view of vision, and the “traditional view” of representationmore
generally, are untenable.
This pushes awareness back another step, since we are no longer in direct contact with the
world and even our indirect representations of it are not necessarily trustworthy. How can
we form seemingly reliable concepts about an external world we are unreliably connected
to through narcissistically-generated percepts? Our behaviour in the external world — to
say nothing of the success of the empirical sciences — appears to conﬁrm the “traditional
view” of mental content, but if our sensory systems are narcissistic, a new account must be
deployed to explain how meaningfully reliable action is possible. The disconnect between
the external world and our internal representations of that external world is what we shall
refer to as the “representational gap”.
One solution is to generalize Akins’ views on sensory systems such that it applies to con-
ceptual systems as well. This paper will argue that our conceptual representations seem
stable, ordered, and uniform as if they represent the world as it is because of what we are
(we are embodied) and what we do (we are enactive). This move seeks to close the “repre-
sentational gap” by explaining how we can reliably interact with the external world relying
solely on narcissistic sensory systems. After laying some groundwork regarding Akins’ the-
ory (section 2), and ﬂeshing out the exact nature of the “representational gap” (section 3),
two arguments will be presented to support the notion that our conceptual systems are
narcissistic: a) they are dependent on percepts that are narcissistic (section 4), and b) they
are narcissistic in and of themselves (section 5).
2 Narcissistic Sensory Systems
As narcissists, sensory systems shape their reports on sensory stimuli based on self-interested
parameters without a view to the objective state of the world, hence they are not reliable,
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structure-preserving, or unbiased (or “servile”). Akins presents thermoreceptors as an ex-
ample of such a narcissistic sensory system [2, 345-352] and what follows is a synopsis of
her account.
Though we might be tempted to treat our thermoreceptors as little thermometers, the
system is far more complex. Our temperature sensations are registered by four receptors:
two thermoreceptors that are triggered by both cool and warm middling temperatures,
and two nociceptors that report indistinguishable pain responses at very high or very low
temperatures. As we shall see, the operation of the thermal sensory system is such that it
does not appear to conform to the criteria deﬁned by the “traditional view”.
2.1 Thermoreception: Reliability
Our sensations of cold or warmth do not reliably covary with absolute or changing tem-
peratures, and diﬀerent sorts of thermal sensations can be produced by identical absolute
skin temperatures. This is due to the fact that the number of receptors varies across the
body — the nose has a 8:1 ratio of cold to warm receptors compared to the lips, which
bear almost exclusively cold receptors — and therefore some parts of the body are more
sensitive to both static and dynamic temperature. Moreover, individual receptors report as
a group, such that in locations featuring more cold receptors, cold is more acutely felt, and
conversely, in areas with few cold receptors, cold is barely felt at all.
Imagine immersing one hand in hot water and one in cold water, in Lockean fashion, and
then after a period of time, placing both in lukewarm water. Were thermoreceptors reli-
able, they would report the same temperature in both hands, and yet the hand previously
immersed in cold water feels warmer when it is immersed in lukewarm water. Our “little
thermometers” have failed to reliably track temperature changes in the world, but for good
reason: rapid temperature changes are dangerous to biological organisms, regardless of
the absolute temperature involved, and so it makes adaptive sense for our sensory sys-




“Structure-preserving” may be thought of as a relation whereby some conﬁguration in the
world (e.g., change along a continuum) is mirrored by some representation of that con-
ﬁguration. If thermal sensations were structure-preserving and you were to slowly lower
yourself into a tank ﬁlled with cold water, you would feel a uniform decrease in tempera-
ture. Given that the absolute temperature decrease on the soles of your feet (sensed as
stimulus S1) would be the same as the temperature decrease on your abdomen (sensed
as stimulus S2) we should expect both S1 and S2 to produce equal cold sensations, and
yet, due to diﬀerences in the distribution and concentration of cold thermoreceptors, this
would not be the case, as anyone who has ever slowly slipped into a frigid lake can attest.
Additionally, if thermoreceptors were structure-preserving, a linear increase in temperature
would result in a linear increase in a thermoreceptor’s ﬁring rate. As it turns out, cold
receptors feature an elliptical static response function such that very low temperatures
and very high temperatures (for the range of temperatures they are capable of sensing)
prompt similar ﬁring rates. In other words, cold receptors are highly excitable at both ends
of the continuumwithout distinguishing the structure of change along the continuum. Even
though this eﬀect is muted for warmth, it is still the case that thermoreceptors are not as
structure-preserving as we should expect under the “traditional view”.
2.3 Thermoreception: Servility
Lastly, our thermoreceptors should be servile and present an unbiased picture of the ther-
mal status of the environment to higher level processors for analysis. Are our thermore-
ceptors like this? It seems not. Both low temperatures for cold receptors and high tem-
peratures for warmth receptors produce wildly exaggerated responses. This is also true
for diﬀerent locations on the body; for example, cold temperatures are acutely felt in the
head more than in the feet, as it is in the survival interest of the organism to react swiftly
to threats to sensitive organs such as the brain. Due to their functional role in preserving
the organism as a whole, thermoreceptors are less interested in reporting “it is this cold up
here” and more interested in reporting “it is too cold up here”.
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Wemight grant that thermoreception is narcissistic without accepting that this undermines
tracking theories. We might suggest that thermoreception seems like too niche a sensory
system to provoke general worries about the reliability of sensory representations. If nar-
cissism was true of vision, however, Akins’ argument would have wider applicability. Is
vision reliable, structure-preserving, and servile?
2.4 Vision: Reliability
A lack of “reliability” (in the sense we have been using it) does not mean that our sensory
systems are uniformly false, only that they fail to consistently represent the world as it
is objectively. Vision is often exalted as the sense we depend on most for representing
the world internally, and yet there is good empirical evidence to suggest that much like
thermoreception, it is capable of distortion. This section will brieﬂy focus on illusion as the
prototypical case for vision’s lack of reliability.
The Argument from Illusion argues that the direct realist view of the world, “what you see
is what there is”, must be deeply mistaken. The canonical example is that of the bent stick:
immersing a stick in a water-ﬁlled glass may appear to bend the stick, and the perceptual
representation formed as a result of seeing the stick is one of a bent stick, but this is not a
reliable depiction of the state of the stick [3]. Illusions such as this one, and the Müller-Lyer
Illusion — the addition of arrowheads or “ﬁns” can make equal lines appear unequal —
demonstrate that vision does not always accurately reﬂect the external world, and under
certain conditions it returns falsity rather than truth.
Even seemingly basic percepts such as colour are subject to widespread distortion, such
as in the case of illuminant metameric failure. This eﬀect can occur when two objects, say
a pair of coﬀee cups, colour-match under a set of incandescent lights but fail to match
under a set of ﬂuorescent lights due to the latter’s spectral emittance curve. Metameric
failure can even occur under “normal lighting conditions” between observers with “normal
vision” due to the yellowing of lens in the human eye resulting from individual physiological
diﬀerences or age [4]. As a result, a single coﬀee cup may be perceived as slightly diﬀerent
in colour by two diﬀerent perceivers, or a single perceiver at diﬀerent ages. If we cannot
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reliably identify the colour of an object using some objective critieria— or if colour is not a
reliably sensible property at all as some colour theorists claim — this is a problem for the
“traditional view”.
2.5 Vision: Structure-Preserving
If vision were strictly structure-preserving, we would expect the arrangement of objects
in the external world to be mirrored by our visual representations. Numerous studies,
however, show that this is not always the case. These visual distortions are similar to
those presented in the previous section, but have the added quirk of being triggered in
a top-down manner by a representation-bearer’s pre-existing internal states. “Top-down”
processing occurs when non-sensory states or representations inﬂuence perception, and
is distinguished from “bottom-up” processing where stimuli passively shapes representa-
tional content. This form of illusion is a particular form of narcissism that will be revisited
in later sections, but for now it is enough to note that it causes our representations of the
external world to be structurally inaccurate. For example, our visuospatial representations
for grade and distance can be skewed based on non-visual information in the following
ways: a) patients with chronic pain perceive distances while walking to be greater than
controls [5], b) perceived distance is exaggerated for an individual carrying a heavy load
[6], c) the geographic slant of hills are perceived as steeper when fatigue sets in [7], d) the
perceived distance to the ground when standing on a balcony is inﬂuenced by one’s fear of
falling [8], and e) novel contexts can cause people to misperceive their ability to reach an
object by aﬀecting internal simulations of the action [9].
2.6 Vision: Servility
Top-downmediation of visual perception is also a problem for the servility of our visual sys-
tem. For example, it has been demonstrated that an individual’s perception of coin size can
be inﬂuenced by the coin’s value to the individual [10]. The value of the coin is not, strictly
speaking, a fact about the external world, and yet it is perceived by individuals as if it were.
One explanation for this eﬀect is that if vision is narcissistic, it will overrepresent valuable
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objects in the environment to increase the chance they will be noticed. Though two indi-
viduals may observe the same object, their phenomenological experience (the subjective
“what it is like”) may diﬀer; this may be because our brain translates sensory representa-
tions into conceptual representations while adding or dropping properties based on our
aﬀect or the object’s unique emotion salience for us [11].
Expertise also has an eﬀect on perception: softball players with better batting averages
perceive softballs as larger, children who are better at throwing balls at a target perceive
the target as larger, and tennis players with a higher return rate see the net as lower [12].
These top-down results challenge the notion of vision as servile; if our visual system was
servile, we would expect it to behave in a purely bottom-up fashion, returning exclusively
unbiased information about the external world.
If our sensory systems are supposed to be reliable, structure-preserving, and servile, but
this is not the case, how is it that we are able to make our way in the world? Surely these
three criteria are critical for stimulus-response behaviour, without which, humans could
not thrive, let alone survive.
3 The Representational Gap
It certainly seems like our internal representations reliably coincide with the external world,
but if our sensory systems are narcissistic, that relation cannot be direct. If visual percep-
tion is not like a little camera, how can we account for the ostensibly high-deﬁnition con-
cepts we have in our head? Imagine a cup on the table in front of you; the cup may be
quite ordinary, but the fact that the conceptual representation <CUP> exists at all is unde-
niably remarkable. <CUP> has an associated colour that appears stable even if its surface
reﬂectance varies wildly depending on ambient lighting or subtle lens colouring (i.e., colour
constancy). <CUP> relies on the fact that although it radically transforms as you alter your
perspective, it has a stable shape (i.e., shape constancy). <CUP> relies on your understand-
ing that this particular cup shares some type-token relation with other similar cups in your
cupboard, and it relies on the fact that you believe those other cups to be in the cupboard
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even though you cannot see them at the moment (i.e., object permanence). This “ability to
impose stability, order, and uniformity upon a conception of the world” [2] is what Akins
refers to as the “ontological project”. In contrast, our sensory systems have very speciﬁc
tasks (the “sensory-motor project”), none of which seem to account for the vast and com-
plex ontology stored as conceptual representations [2]. In other words, we cannot explain
our concepts using our percepts. Wemight call this the “representational gap” and it seems,
at ﬁrst glance, intractable.
If pushed to explain why our sensory systems seem like poor cameras but our concepts
seem like the equivalent of high-deﬁnition photographs, we may simply deny that the lat-
ter is true. Rather, we might claim that conceptual systems are narcissistic as well and the
high deﬁnition is illusory; our concepts are satisﬁcing (Herbert Simon’s “good enough” [13])
but because they serve us well, we assume they are perfectly veridical. Collectively, our
sensory systems have a speciﬁc task, which is delivering information to our motor system
to facilitate approach-avoidance behaviour [14]. Thermoreception and vision are not lit-
tle thermometers or little cameras and are not interested in reporting the outside world
per se, instead they are exclusively tasked with reporting certain objects and events that
correspond to their organism’s biological requirements. This sort of narcissism may be
deﬁned as both: a) embodied, in that our sensory systems are primarily egocentric and
morphological, and b) enactive, in that our sensory systems are primarily concerned with
facilitating interactions with the external world. Percepts, the representations generated
by our sensory systems, may be narcissistic, but how might we argue that our concepts
are also narcissistic? There are two arguments for this position: we might argue that our
conceptual systems are narcissistic because of their dependence on narcissistic sensory
content (the Extrinsic Argument) and/or because they are embodied and enactive like our
narcissistic sensory systems (the Intrinsic Argument).
The Extrinsic Argument (section 4) states that if concepts are grounded in percepts which
are narcissistic, we should expect the former to be narcissistic as well. The unstated (but
hardly controversial) premise in this argument is that a system is narcissistic if its content
is narcissistic, and vice versa.
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P1. Sensory systems are narcissistic.
P2. Conceptual systems are grounded in sensory content.
C1. Therefore, conceptual systems are narcissistic (from P1,P2).
The Intrinsic Argument (section 5) states that a narcissistic conceptual system does not
need to be reliable, structure-preserving, or servile, only tuned for action some representation-
bearer may take in the world (i.e., enactive) and based on both the nature and environment
of that representation-bearer (i.e., embodied).
P1. To be narcissistic, our conceptual systems should be:
a) embodied, and b) enactive.
P2a. Conceptual systems are embodied.
P2b. Conceptual systems are enactive.
C1. Therefore, conceptual systems are narcissistic (from P1, P2a-b).
4 The Extrinsic Argument
The claim that sensory systems are narcissistic (Premise 1) can be demonstrated by the fact
that some of our sensory systems do not conform to the “traditional view” because they
are neither: a) reliable, b) structure-preserving, nor c) servile (as per section 2).
Grounding our conceptual representational systems in sensory content (Premise 2), how-
ever, requires a dependence relation between the system that generates percepts and the
system that generates concepts. The exact nature of this relation is beyond the scope
of this paper but for the Extrinsic Argument to hold, the relation need only be such that
the content of concepts be reliant on the content of percepts. This could mean that con-
cepts are related to perceptual data (i.e., “weak dependence”) or that concepts simply are
repurposed perceptual data (i.e., “strong dependence”). Either the weak or the strong de-




For a weak dependence relation to exist between percepts and concepts, we must be able
to show that our concepts are, in some way, inﬂuenced by our sensory systems. This is an
intuitive position for the tracking theorist, since they have already committed to the notion
that our sensors connect us to the external world. The compromise they would have to
make is in the type of relation that holds between our representations and objects and
events in the world, since they cannot claim it is the relation suggested by the “traditional
view”. If the weak dependence can be demonstrated, then concepts should import many
of the narcissistic qualities of the percepts on which they depend. A concept even partially
reliant on narcissistic percepts would close the “representational gap” such that the exter-
nal world as we perceive it could achieve a degree of parity with the internal world as we
conceive it, all through sharing some mental content.
In two experiments conducted by Intons-Peterson and Roskos-Ewoldsen [15], participants
were asked to imagine carrying either a cannonball or a balloon as they mentally traversed
a novel or known map. Their results argued that our concepts carry sensory information
such as “size, weight, color, uses, kinesthetic properties of hefting it” [15] and are partly
deﬁned by it. It seems natural to assume that our concepts would carry sensory data in
this manner, but if this is true, then our concepts carry narcissistic sensory data with all the
embodied-enactive distortions that implies.
These percept-concept relations are thought to begin at a young age. It is theorized that
infants derive concepts such a “animacy, inanimacy, agency, and containment” [16] from
their earliest perceptual experiences, and that this allows them to form “image schemas”
to connect percepts of the external world to concepts in language. An image schema is a
dynamic (i.e., they occur across across time), multimodal (i.e., they involve various sensory
modalities) conceptual construct that represents patterns of interaction such as the spatial
relations reﬂected in our concepts of <IN> and <OUT>. For example, image schemas for
momentum can aﬀect how we form concepts across a number of modalities: the collision
of heavy objects informs and is informed by visual momentum; the transport of heavy ob-
jects informs and is informed by kinesthetic momentum; the melodic expectation created
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by crescendo [17] informs and is informed by auditory momentum. In this way, conceptual
representations of “momentum” are reducible to sensory representations [18].
4.2 Strong Dependence
In subsection 2.6 we demonstrated that concepts could aﬀect the processing and gener-
ation of percepts through top-down mediation. This section will show that the tracking
theorists’ intuition about bottom-up processing — our representations are about what we
sense in the world — is not mistaken, it is simply incomplete. If our representations, both
perceptual and conceptual, mediate each other in top-down and bottom-up fashion, per-
haps the distinction is illusory. Strong dependence of the type argued for here claims that
conceptual representations are of a kind with perceptual representations, and that the dif-
ference is in use.
Lawrence Barsalou’s theory of “perceptual symbol systems” suggests a way in which con-
cepts are grounded in sensory systems while also forming a representational system that
spans both the perceptual and the conceptual. On this view, concepts are based in physical,
sensorimotor experiences, such that “to represent the concept CHAIR, neural systems for
vision, action, touch, and emotion partially produce the experience of a particular chair”
[19]. If our sensors are narcissistic, and our concepts are perceptual symbols realized in
“interaction simulators” where possible actions are tested, our concepts will be narcissis-
tic necessarily. Moreover, this model would account for many of the cognitive processes
we believe underlie conceptual representation, e.g., type-token and propositional relations,
categorical inference, productivity, and other abstracta [20]. Our “representational gap” is
closed by virtue of being labelled a misleading dichotomy in the ﬁrst place; representations
arising from our sensory systems are repurposed in simulators to produce concepts but
they are only distinct in source and function, not content.
Whether or not we choose to be motivated by the arguments for weak or strong depen-
dence, there is good reason to believe our concepts are related to our percepts in such a
way as to make narcissism a thoroughgoing phenomenon in our representational systems.
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5 The Intrinsic Argument
Another way to argue for the narcissism of conceptual representation is to explain the
system in terms of its function. The narcissism of the sensory systems we have reviewed
(section 2) are embodied and enactive, so perhaps our conceptual representations will have
these traits as well.
5.1 Conceptual Representations: Embodied
While the term “embodied” covers a wide variety of related schools of thought, the com-
mon thread is a view of cognition that emerges from treating the brain and the body as
a cohesive unit. Put another way: “cognition is not represented in terms of propositional
and sentential information but is grounded in and structured by various patterns of our
perceptual interactions, bodily actions, and manipulations of objects” [18, 1192]. If our
conceptual systems are embodied in this way, we should expect representational content
to be both generated and constrained by the state and/or nature of the body in which the
system operates. Our conceptual representation <CUP>, for example, “would be the kinds
of experiences we have had, are now having, or might someday have, with that sort of
thing” given the type of body we have [21, 5].
If concepts are embodied, they should apply equally well to more abstract things such as
mathematics and logic. Mathematics, according to Lakoﬀ and Nunez [22], can be under-
stood as a series of conceptual metaphors that are a product of human interaction with the
world: arithmetic is object collection, geometry is objects in space, change is motion, sets
are containers, and even numbers themselves can be represented as points or line seg-
ments. Likewise, logical principles such as transitivity can be thought of in terms of bodily
interactions with containers; if an individual puts tea in the cup and puts the cup in the
microwave, the tea is also in the microwave, or more formally: if object T is in container
C1, and container C1 is in container C2, then T is in container C2 [21, 6].
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5.2 Conceptual Representations: Enactive
If conceptual systems are enactive, we should expect them to express and be expressed
as action possibilities. For example, the representation <BALL> may carry diﬀerent content
depending on the situation in which <BALL> and <BALL>-bearer ﬁnd themselves. <BALL> in
a high school gymnasium may carry content pertaining to its bounciness, whereas <BALL>
in a shipwreck may carry content pertaining to its buoyancy. This is, obviously, a limited
example; in real world scenarios, the representation <BALL> would include some repre-
sentation of the environment and other relevant objects (e.g., ball & gym & hoop or ball
& water & ship). These conjunct representations ﬁt within a larger representation, a men-
tal model, that allows for simulations to be run on action possibilities. Mental models are
one way in which representations may be characterized as enactive, but there is signiﬁ-
cant overlap with other enactivist accounts. What follows is a brief review of three similar
accounts: mental models, simulators, interactivism.
While there is no consensus in the literature as to the precise nature of mental models,
but they are generally deﬁned as: limited and composed of incomplete facts, dynamic and
transient, and capable of selectively inﬂuencing perception. Each model is an individual or
set of conceptual representations that simulates relevant interaction possibilities so that
consequences can be evaluated and actions selected [23]. As we would expect from a
narcissistic system, mental models are “reality reductive” in that they pare the external
world to the core that is relevant to the representation-bearer.
Building on the notion of a mental model, simulation accounts of representation are a class
of theory that describes concepts as the product of simulations, as with Barsalou’s percep-
tual symbol systems [19]. Simulations may be actions (e.g., <CUP> may include simulations
of drinking from a cup), perceptions (e.g., <CUP> may include simulations of seeing a cup),
or anticipatory behaviour (e.g., <CUP>may include simulations of carefully picking up a cup
ﬁlled with hot tea) [24]. These simulations are built from conceptual representations but
activate the same areas in the brain as the actions, perceptions and behaviour, and so are
directly related to the representation-bearer’s perceptual state, physical state and physical
environment.
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The interactivist model of representation is an account that can be said to draw upon men-
tal models and simulators. According to this theory, concepts emerge from action selection
in biological systems; organisms conceptually represent due to the fact that environments
require action, and actions necessarily involve the anticipation and evaluation of action out-
comes [25]. For example, an individual seeing a cup may represent <CUP> as: i) grasping,
ii) lifting, iii) drinking; an individual seeing a cat may represent <CAT> as: i) approaching,
ii) reaching, iii) petting. If these interactions generate competition, they may be internally
simulated, and the action set with the most desired outcome will be selected.
Thus, if our conceptual systems are embodied (Premise 2a) and enactive (Premise 2b) like
our sensory systems, we may help ourselves to the conclusion that they are narcissistic like
those systems. If both systems are narcissistic in the same manner, the “representational
gap” is closed; our concepts can represent the external world usefully using narcissistic sen-
sors because their goals are one and the same: move the representation-bearer towards
positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli.
Conclusions
The goal of this paper has been to restore parity between what you perceive and what
you conceive while accounting for the fact that neither perfectly mirrors what there is in
the external world. This “representational gap” demands we reframe our understanding of
conceptual representations: to close this gap wemustmove from concepts that are amodal
symbol strings that represent objective reality to concepts that are narcissistic, embodied
and enactive. If we accept that concepts are narcissistic by weak or strong dependence
on narcissistic sensory systems — or narcissistic in their own right — this reframing can
be supported by a healthy amount of empirical research. The solutions presented in this
paper are not the only possible solutions for closing the gap, and many questions still
remain, including: which embodied-enactive account best captures the narcissism of our
representations? What are the neural mechanisms and substrates involved? How does
an account of embodied-enactive representations ﬁt into the wider literature of mental
representations? Despite these lingering questions, there is something satisfying about
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the conclusion that our internal representations need not account for all the external facts,
just the facts that prove adaptive. In summary: what you see is what you get, but what you
get is not necessarily what there is; what you get is about what you are and what you can
do.
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